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IN THE SUPREME COGfil OF THE STATE OF L"I'AH

IVAN JENKINS,
Plalil.tiff-Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
CHARLES M. PARRISH,

Case No. 15905

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELIANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for rredical malpractice brought by the plaintiff, Ivan
Jenkins, agalil.st the defendant, Dr. Charles M. Parrish, a specialist in the
field of open-heart surgery, for injuries sustalil.ed during the course of openheart surgery from 'Nhich the plaintiff suffered severe brain darnage and blindness, and which occurred as a result of the defendant' s failure to supply an
adequate blood supply to the Plalil.tiff during the open-heart surgery.
DISPOSITION IN THE I.DWER COURI'
The case was brought on a theory of negligence and was tried before a
jury.

The trial court submitted the issues of liability and damages to the

jury.

Upon the evidence the appellant was allowed to present, and upon the

instructions of the court, the jury found that the defendant was not negligent.
The appellant's rrotions for a directed verdict and new trial were denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the decision in the trial court below
and an order remanding tJ1e case for a new trial.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF F?.CTS

A.

Error Cammi tted in Selection of Jury.

During the

course of the voir dire examination in open court, one of

t~

jurors, Judith Eddins, volunteered that her ex-husband was a
veterinarian and her father was an M.D.

(i'ledical Doctor) (R. 68 ,

The venireman further volunteered "The fact that my father was
an M.D. would influence rr,e."

(R.

689.l

Counse 1 for appellant

specifically challenged this juror for cause.

(R.

690.)

Appellant's counsel then requested that the court conduct a
further hearing of the matter in chambers so as to not belabor·
matter of bias and prejudice before the entire jury panel. (R. •
The court then held a hearing in chambers in which questions wt:
asked of the venireman Judith Eddins which established that:
1.

She would be somewhat partial to the doctor.

2.

She would feel that the defendant medical doctor's

testimony would be "more likely to be truthful than untruthful.
3.

She would give more weight to his testimony simply

because he's a doctor.

(R.

699-702,

see Appendix "A".)

Thereupon the in camera proceeding was concluded and after a
few additional questions by the coi.:rt, plaintiff's counsel ren<"
their challenge for cause of venireman Eddins which the court
denied.

( R. 699.)

Whereupon the plaintiff's counsel removed

venireman Eddins by exercising peremptorial challenge (Plaintii:
number 3, R.
B.

369).
Errors Cammi tted Durina Trial.

The appellant in

February of 1972 was a 46-year-old man who had been employ~~
a rigger for Kennecott Copper Corpora ti on.

The appellant hac

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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been having difficulty with heart problems, but previously had
no difficulty with vision, equilibrium, coordination, memory,
personality change or speech until he had open heart surgery on
February 21,

1972, by the respondent, Dr. Charles M. Parrish,

a thoracic and cardiovascular surgeon.

Appellant first was seen

by the respondent doctor in the early part of February 1972.
Thereafter, certain tests were administered to the appellant,
and the respondent doctor advised the appellant to have open heart
surgery for a triple by-pass graft of veins upon the heart.

The

operation was a success as far as intended to correct the heart
difficulties.

No claim is made concerning the heart repair

itself.
Appellant makes claim for injuries that occurred due to
improper perfusion (supplying inadequate pressures and amounts of
oxygenated blood to vital organs, specifically, the brain and
eyes) during the surgery upon the heart.

The injuries claimed were

partial blindness, certain loss of coordination and impairment of
equilibrium, memory loss, personality changes and slowness of speech.
Appellant's doctors, Dr. Charles Bailey, a cardiovascular surgeon,
Dr. William Hoyt, a neuro-ophthalmologist, and Dr. Ward Woods,
a neurologist, all testified that these injuries had occurred
during and as a result of the perfusion inadequacy during the
open heart surgical procedure.

(R· 1362, Appendix B, 891.)

The appellant, his wife, family and friends all verify that the
appellant complained of these problems iminediately after the
surgery at various times during the recuperative period.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(R. 1271-1280, 794-803, 807-813, 1253-1255.) Dr. Parrish's hospital record
and his office record do not re=rd any problem, as though it didn •t exist,
until six weeks after the surgery when,he referred in an office note to
Post Purrp visual proble'11S.

(~.

852-859, Exhibit 2P.)

Dr. Parrish

admitt~

that coordinated visual problems appearing irnrediately after surgery would:
significant and he would stop doing surgery until the problem was found.

(R. 851-3, 2037.)

But, he !l'ade no such investigation. (R. 857-9, 871, 888.

At the trial, Dr. Parrish, the defendant and respondent, testifa:
concerning the surgery he perforrr.ed and the rrenner in which it was carrieJ
out.
Certain procedures designed to insure ade:ruate flow from the hear
lung purrp were omitted, and certain other pr=edures fell below the standar:
of acceptable rniru.rrel care exercised by experts in the sarre field in citle<
of corrparable size, and throughout the medical profession accordir1g to Dr.
Charles Bailey, a noted cardiovascular surgeon.

Dr. B:l.iley was professor

and director of the department of thoracic surgery at Hahnerran Medical Coll'
fran 1952 U."ltil 1959 and chainnan of the department of surgery at New Yorx
!V'edical College fran 1959 to 1962, then an instructor of cardiovascular
surgery fran 1962 until 1974. (R. 1309.)

Dr. Bailey has written over 200

medical articles, alrrost all of than on thoracic surgery and heart surgery;
he has written three rredical books and contributed to several other tooks.

( R. 1313-1314.)

He has an honorary Doctor of Hurran Letters from Rutgers

University and an honorary Doctor of Law fran Hahnerran Medical College,
;.ias

an:

part of a team which received the J>merican 1':€dical Association's gold

medal award for presentations on heart surgery in 1951 and in 1971. He
belongs to a multitude of medical s=ieties, including honorary merntersrJf·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in Portugal, Brazil, Mexico and has lectured and derronstrated all over the
united States, was president of the International College of surgeons and a
rrerrter of every rrajor national thoracic surgery society in the United states.
(R. 1314-1316 .)

He was one of the pioneers in by-pass graft vascularization

procedures. (R. 1318.)

Dr. Bailey testified of countless contacts with

physicians from all over the United States at the national rreetings of the
various societies and organizations to which he has J::elonged.
Both Dr. Bailey and the defendant Parrish were trained in thoracic
surgery in New York City. (R. 836.)

Dr. Parrish's testirrony was to the

effect that when Mr. Jenkins went on the pump, the blood pressure started at
a level of 30-35 and then slowly rose during the procedure. (R. 1013-1015.)
Neither he nor his technician actually recorded what the blood pressures had
teen during the pump run. (R. 972 .) In the years J::efore Mr. Jenkins' operation,
Dr. Parrish had followed procedures to determine e:xactly how much blood went

into the patient, that is, the perfusion flow rate during the pump run.
(R. 877, 961, 1017.) The doctor originally calculated the necessary flow rate
l::efore surgery in order to provide an adequate am:nmt of oxygen to the
tissue (R. 877-78), rreasured the brain function with an electroencephelogram
(R. 1017), and rronitored the blood temperature at the pump (R. 1018), and
measured the oxygen in the blood (R. 1018-20), but discontinued all of these
precautions.

Dr. Parrish's pump technician kept the infonration concerning

flow rates on a specific fonn (Exhibit 6P, R. 887).

At the trial, the flow

rate of 1, 000 cc• s per minute recorded by the technician was disclaimed by
Dr. Parrish as an "obviously incorrect flow rate." (R. 888-89.)

The trial

court refused to require Dr. Parrish to answer the question as to whether or
the S.J. Quinney Law actually
Library. Funding for felt
digitization provided
the Institutecc's
of Museum
and Library
Services
not, if theSponsored
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flow rate, then that purrp technician

\-JO.S

irrproperly trained. (F.. 888-S?.)

Dr. Parrish excll.3ed tr.is technical error by stating that he relied on tf.€
patient's blood pressure rather than following the flow rate (R. 888-8?).
even trough he admitted there were instances where the flow rate could dz:
but blood pressure would rerrain constant (R. 962), such as when drugs
that cause vasodilation, which leads to r:oolinc; of blood

in

are~.

the veins. 1.0.

During the course of the trial, the appellant ' s counsel called
Dr. Parrish's purrp technician, Diane nelson, who worked under the directi::

of the resp:indent surgeon, as to practices she eniployed while operating th€
heart-lung by-pass machir:e durir.g course of the surgery.
Dr. Parrish's purrp technician was merely trair.ed to put the blo:i

back into the 1:xxl.y v.:hich carre out. (R. 893, 1043.)
p:ioling cf the blood

in

However, if there is

the veins, then it wouldn 't return to the P\JIT1P for

the l::xxiy ar.d, therefore, the flow rate would go down.

R. 905.

Jr. Pare:

used large arrounts of rrorphine, which is a ver.ous vasodilator, accord.inc; ::
the testirrony of Dr. Bailey; but Dr. Parrish didn't know whether it was a
vasodilator or not (R. 905-06), and it is, therefore, reasor.atle to cor;cl\:::
that Dr. Parrish would be unaware of this effect causi.."'lg a reduction of L:
rates.
The plaintiff's evidence at trial was to the effect that accordl::
to the standard of care of capable, competent thoracic heart surgeons in
similar localities, it was a departure fran the standard of care to rrerel;· -,
sure that the blood which carre fran the purrp was pun;ped back into the paue:
and it was a departure fran the standard of care to let the blood pressure
drop down to the 30-35 range.

i'.>.ccording to the testi:cony 0f Dr. Charles

Bailey,
rrore precautions were required by the general comnuni ty of thorac;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

5 urgeons

who practiced in similar localities.

Dr. Bailey testified that it

.,;as :ncuml:::ent upon the operating surgeon and his pump technician to:
1.

M:iir1tain a blood pressure above fifty millirreters of rrercury during

t~e tll11e the heart-lung rrachine provides the blood flow and pressure,

esrecially when the patient has a pre-operative blood pressure of 120 over 80,
and a rr.ean pressure of about 95 to 100.

R. 1347-1349.

hltrDugh Dr. Parrish permitted the blood pressure to hover as low
as 30, brain darrage occurs when the mean pressure is allowed to be below 50
for any significant period of tirre. (R. 1848.)

2.

Calibrate the blood flow going into the patient through the heart-lung

p\Jl11p and to rraintain a minimum standard of flow to keep the brain and tissues

alive.
Dr. Parrish's agent and pump technician kept a record of flows on a
PllllP infusion record.

She did not calibrate the rrachine, and the numbers

recorded were so low that a human of
(?.

1341 and 1343.)

~ir.

Jenkin's size could not renain alive.

The flow rates recorded were stated by Dr. Parrish and

Dr. Bailey to be in error. ( R. 988-89, 1343 .) The pump technician did not

atterrpt to calibrate the pump rrachine, but, rather, relied on the calibration
made years before by a f oTITier technician who calibrated the purrp using a
different sized tubing. (R. 1045-1048.)
Thus, the tech."lician and the surgeon could not and did not know the
rate of blood flow into the patient during surgery.
3.

Assess and rraintain a minimum flow rate of blood through the Cody

fran the heart-lung pump rrachine.

The minimum blood flow necessary to prevent

brain and tissue injury was high when the body temperature was high and was
the temperature
the
brain
andprovided
tissues
were
lower·
(~.
1345-1347 .)
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Dr. Parrish reduced the blood flow tefore the brain teITlj:€rature ,.,,
cooled down to where it could survive on such flow (R. 1348), and warmed ur
the l:::ody tefore increasing the blood perfusion flow. ( R. 1346 .)
4.

Assess the blood flow by direct measurerrent rather than by relyir;

blood pressure, which was not proportional to flow. (R. 1350-1351, 1354.)
Dr. Parrish and his technician relied on replacerrent of the bleo;
which cane out of· the patient's l:::ody and on the patient's blood pressure to
determine adequacy of flow.

I f the blood pooled in the patient's veins, or

if the blood was lost through the herrorrhage which is part of surgery, ther.
there would te reduced venous return and reduced perfusion flow. ( R. 1351-1':
At the same time, the blood pressure may te up when blood perfusic
flow (to the crain and orgar.s) is down. (R. 1350-1351.) So, direct rreasurere
of flow is necessary to prevent brain dalrage.

5.

Z1easure the l:::ody terrperature at a point which would reflect the

brain terrperature rather than the terrperature of the inflow of cooling blo:x
which was used to cool the l:::ody.
Dr. Parrish placed a thenrometer in the esophagus next to the int:

of blood fran the heart-lung Pll!1'P.

He should have used a rectal therrrorreter

which rrore accurately reflects how much the l:::ody has teen cooled. (R. 1343-L
This is important where the surgeon artificially stops the patier.t
teating heart tefore the brain temperature has teen reduced to a safe level.
'Ihe heart-lung pU!l'p flow was so much lower than the nonral flow put out by r

heart that the brain would te endangered if the brain terriperature were Wl
high. (R. 1344-1347 .)
Sinoe Dr. Parrish's Plll11P technician had been erroneously recordif'.
flow rates for several years, plaintiff proffered the testirrony of Mr. Cte
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Dyson, a pump technician fran San Diego and Los Jlngeles, who, as noted ab:Jve,
was well-qualified and who established a foundation that there was a
national certifying organization of pi..rrrp technicians known as the Arrerican
society of Extracorporeal Technicians.

Mr. Dyson had attended nurrerous

conferences and seminars for pump technicians and thoracic surgeons and had
lllPressive credentials to establish the foundation that he was familiar with
the practice of other pump technicians and that the field was not practiced by
rugged individualists.

The court sustained objections' to his testirrony based

on lack of foundation where plaintiff' s cotIDsel could not qualify Mr. Dyson as
an expert witness as to the standard of care expected of pi..rrrp technicians in
the same locality, that is, Salt lake City.
The court did not allow the testirrony of Charles Dyson, pi..rrrp
technician fran San Diego and Los lfilgeles who had run sane l, 500

pi..rrrp

runs

(R. 1081), trained other pi..rrrp technicians in both San Diego and Los Jlngeles,
taught Cardiac Pulrronary Physiology at the college level (R. 1070), was
certified by the Arrerican SOciety of Extracorporeal Technicians since 1970
( a society that meets regularly and publishes guidelines for standards of
practice in the field of open-heart surgery) .(R. 1064-67.)

This national

accrediting organization holds regional professional rreetings and conferences
just like physicians do. (R. 1068-70.)
Mr. Dyson had read nurrerous texts and medical periodicals concerning
perfusion, attended nurrerous conferences and seminars for pi..rrrp technicians
and thoracic surgeons, was familiar with the Sams heart-lung P\.ID"P of the type
used on the appellant (R. 1075-78), and had nurrerous other qualifications to
testify as to the standards of a similar locality. (R. 1062-78, 1108-1113.) He
•,vas of the Sponsored
opinion
that
there
was
a forminimum
standard
of
practice
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technicians throughout the country. (R. 1109.) But the trial court sust ·

air.~

an objection based on lack of foundation where plaintiff's counsel could r.r
qualify his expert witness as to the standard of care in the sane locality.
(R. 1113.)

Before this, plaintiff presented evidence that Dr. Parrish and t:,
other physicians whc were practicing heart-lung by-pass surgery in Salt

J..a.i:'

City in 1972 were not trained in Salt Lake City for the perforrre.nce of

t~t

surgery in general.

Dr. Parrish adrni tted that the physicians were trainee

literraly all over the country, and testified very clearly in the record fa
the standards of practice -were based upon rredical knowledge and exi;:erience
frcm all over the country. (R. 1094-1103.)
Mr. Dyson was not permitted to testify as to the standards eiq::ect2
of a pump technician concerning the frequency of calibration of the heart-le
pump to ::ieternine ;.;hat the actual flow rate was (R. 1119-20), as to what tti
flow rate would be on the rrachine if the rrachine had been calibrated to fk
l, 100 cc' s per minute with quarter-inch tubing and then the tubing was cler.C'

to 3/8-inch tubing, as occurred here (R. 1126), as to whether or not the
esophageal temperature probe used in Mr. Jenkin' s case accurately reflectee:
temperature of the bcdy (R. 1139-41), and finally, the witness was not
permitted to testify as to whether there was a minimum standard of practice
arrong such pump technicians with regard to rronitoring of blood pressure.
(R. 1175-78.)

This latter objection was sustained because of the framin9

of

the question in temtS of an area similar to Salt Lake City, rather than in
Salt Lake City.
On the second day of trail, prior to asking plaintiff's expert

. . ff'
~el had
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
for digitization provided
by the Institute
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sul:mltte

a detailed t\velve-page brief (R. 113) which clearly sets forth the apparent law
within the state of Utah in support of the Similar Locality rule.

Counsel for

the defendant doctor sui:::mitted no rrerrorandurn concerning the standard of care.

[)?spite plaintiff's efforts in submitting the brief and advising the court of
the apparent adoption of the similar locality rule, the trial oourt failed and

refused to rule as to which of the two rules apparently applied (R. 1174), but,
apparently, refused to allow evidence as to the standard of care in a similar
locality, and rather pointedly enforced the strict locality rules.
The court required the appellant to show that his expert witnesses had
experience and were familiar with the same local standard of care that existed
in the Salt Lake City area (R. 1339) which standard, according to the respondent's

expert rredical witnesses (R. 1679-80, 1741-1746), required far fewer precautions,
suggesting a lower standard of care than that enunciated by the appellant's expert
rredical witnesses, Dr. Charles Bailey, the cardiovascular surgeon from New York
City, New York, and Charles Dyson, the pump technician froro IDs Angeles, California
Although Dr. Bailey did qualif'J and did give testinony under the strict locality
rule (R. 1317-1318, 1340), since it was obvious that Dr. Bailey was not as familiar
wib~

the practice in Salt Lake City as the respondent's witnesses, who were

actually practicing in Salt Lake City, the jury, in all probability dismissed Dr.
Bailey's testirrony regarding practice in Salt Lake City as less authoritative.
During the course of the trial, the oourt allowed a surprise witness, Dr.
Russell Nelson, to testify, although his name had not been previously disclosed,
as required at a prior pre-trial hearing held September 12, 1977, and also at
enpaneling of the jury at the oornrencerrent of the trial.
During the cross-examination of defense witnesses, Dr. Nelson and Dr.
Hughes by plaintiff's counsel, the oourt refused to allow the plaintiff's cou.'1Sel
to cross-examine them as to whether their own procedures for operation of the
heart-1 ung Sponsored
pump bywere
the same
asFunding
those
of or.
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fused testirrony ooncerning how the other heart surgeons operated their pumps.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS A JUROR FOR CAV
AND THEREBY FORCED THE PLAINTIFF TO WASTE ONE OF HIS PEREMP'.
CHALLENGES.
A.

The trial court.erred in failing to dismiss

the~~

spective juror, Mrs. Eddins, for cause.
Rule 47 (f) (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, prescribe
challenge for cause upon the grounds, "That a state of
exists on the part of the

mi~

juror with reference to the cause,

or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of
the party challenging."

During the course of the voir diu

of the jury panel, a prospective juror, Judith T. Eddins,
revealed personal relationships which would tend to make it
difficult, if not impossible, for her to be impartial in
tl":::.s ::';pe of lawsuit.

Her father was a medical doctor and,

in addition, she had been married to a veterinarian who had
been a defendant in a malpractice case.

(T.

684).

Mrs.

Eddins was also a personal acquaintance of one of the defendant's expert witnesses, Dr. Robert Wray.

(T •

678 ) •

When

asked whether she could, in spite of these relationships, act
impartially as a juror, she stated that she could not.
(T. 700).

The state of mind evidenced by Mrs. Eddins clearly

comes within the provisions of Rule 4 7 ( f) ( 6) , URCP, and she
should have been dismissed for cause.

The trial court ea~

in failing to do so.
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This Court has consistently required that jurors sitting
in judgment in this state be impartial and unbiased as mandated by Rule 47(f) (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In

Crawford v. Manning, 542 P. 2d 1091 (Utah 1975), a prospective juror was challenged for cause when she indicated
that she had strong feelings about wrongful death actions.
The trial court in Crawford refused to dismiss the witness for
cause, presumably because the witness stated that in spite of
her feelings she could be an impartial and unbiased juror.
This Court reversed holding that in spite of her expressed
desire and ability to remain fair and impartial, she should
have been dismissed for cause.
One doubts that a person who harbors
strong feelings concerning anyone who would
see to recover money for the death of another could be a fair and impartial juror.
(Crawford, supra, at 1092.)
It is apparent from Crawford, supra, that when a prospective juror reveals a state of mind that would obviously
make it doubtful that he or she could remain impartial and
unbiased, such a person must be dismissed for cause to insure
the integrity of the trial, even if the prospective juror in
question affirmatively states that he or she could remain fair
and impartial.

In the instant case, Mrs. Eddins clearly ex-

pressed a biased state of mind, and worse, unlike the Crawford
case

where the prospective juror maintained she could remain

impartial, Mrs. Eddins candidly revealed that she could not
remain impartial.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THE COURT:
Would you be inclined to give
more weight to the testimony of--well, perhaps I'd better not ask it that way.
Even
though your father is a medical doctor,
do I understand that you do not believe that
you would be able to listen to the evidence
and based thereon render a fair and impartial
verdict? Or, let me put it another way:
Do
you think if you were selected as a juror
that you would be able to listen to the evidence and based thereon render a fair and
impartial verdict?'
VENIREMAN EDDINS:
I definitely believe
they can make mistakes.
I would hope I
could listen to it.
But I know I would
be somewhat partial to the doctor.
THE COURT: Well, are you telling me that
you would give more weight to the testimony
which would be presented on behalf of the
defendant in this action simply because he
happens to be a medical doctor?
VENIREMAN EDDINS: No, I think I could weigh
the evidence.
I think when it got to his
personal testimony that would be the only
time it would possibly influence me, and I
would feel it was more likely to be truthful than untruthful.
THE COURT: And I take it, then, your answer would be that you would give more weight
to his testimony simply because he's a
doctor?
VENIREMAN EDDINS:
added.)

I'm afraid so.

(Emphasis

As the transcript shows, there is no question but

~a

Mrs. Eddins should have been removed for cause; she was hl
and candidly said so.

Thus, the facts in the instant case

argue even more strongly for dismissal than those found in
Crawford case.

In a more recent case, this Court reaffirmed its dete

mination to assure that only impartial, unbiased jurors be
empaneled.

State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629 (Utah 1977) prese

the case of a prospective juror who was challenged for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cau

;e.

:r.'

when he stated that he did not know for certain whether he
could act impartially in arriving at a verdict.

The trial

court refused to excuse the prospective juror for cause.
This Court, as in Crawford, again reversed and remanded the
case, holding that the trial judge erred in failing to dismiss the prospective juror for cause since he could not state
affirmatively that he could act impartially as a juror.

Note

that in Moore, supra, there were sufficient grounds to compel
a dismissal for cause when the prospective juror simply could
not state whether or not he could act impartially.

And in

Crawford, supra, even though the prospective juror affirmatively
stated that she could be impartial in spite of her strong
feelings against the type of case involved, the Court held that
she should have been removed for cause.

As pointed out

above, in the instant case Mrs. Eddins not only expressed bias
and prejudice, she actually stated she would have difficulty
remaining impartial.

Clearly under Rule 47(f) (6), and the

Crawford, supra, and Moore, supra, decisions, Mrs. Eddins
should have been dismissed for cause; the trial court committed
reversible error in failing to do so.
B.

The trial court's failure to remove the prospective

juror, Mrs. Eddins, for cause prejudiced the Plaintiff in that
he was forced to waste one of his peremptory challenges to
remove her.
Despite the fact that the prospective juror, Mrs. Eddins,
expressly indicated that she could not remain impartial,

:e;
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(R. 700), the trial judge declined to remove her for cause

I

and it became necessary for the Plaintiff to remove her
use of one of his three peremptory challenges.

~

In the casi

of Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 109 (Utah 1975) this

Cou~

held that a party should not be compelled to waste a

peremptory challenge on a ] uror who should have been excusi
for cause.

In Crawford, supra, the appellant used one of

his three peremptory challenges to remove a prospective jw
whom the trial court should have removed for cause but refused to do so.

Upon review, this Court found that the pn

specti ve juror evidenced actual bias compelling her remova

When the trial court failed to remove the prospective juro:
in question, the Plaintiff was prejudiced in that he was

~

to waste a peremptory challenge to accomplish that which ti
trial court should have done.

This Court reversed and

remanded on that ground, stating:
A party is entitled to exercise his three
(3) peremptory challenges upon impartial
prospective jurors, and he should not
be compelled to waste one in order to
accomplish that which the trial judge
should have done.
(Crawford, supra,
at 1093.)
The Utah Supreme Court has dealt with the same issue
on two occasions since the Crawford, supra, case was decided in 1975.

On both occasions the court has affirmed

its decision in Crawford.

In State v. Moore, 562 P.2d

629 (Utah 1977) the trial court refused to excuse a juror
for cause after the juror indicated actual bias.

The de-

fendant then exercised one of his peremptory challenges
to excuse the juror.

The Court, relying on Crawford,
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~upra,

held that the juror should have been dismissed

for cause, but since he was not, the defendant was forced
to waste one of his peremptory challenges to have the
juror excused.

The Court further held that such was

pre]udicial error, and the defendant was granted a new
trial.
In State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977)
this Court again held that when a trial judge improperly
refused to excuse a juror for cause, thus forcing a party
to waste one or more of his peremptory challenges, that
party has been prejudiced and will be granted a new trial.
In Brooks, two jurors were challenged for cause on the
basis that they were personal friends with key witnesses
for the prosecution.

The trial court, having refused to

excuse the jurors in question, forced the defendant to
waste his peremptory challenges to remove them.

The

Supreme Court, relying on Crawford, supra, reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial stating:
Defendant was entitled to four peremptory
challenges (77-30-lS[b]) all of which he
exercised.
However, since he had to use two
of the four peremptory challenges to remove
the two jurors he challenged for cause, he
was effectively deprived the use of two he
might have used to remove other jurors whom
he so desired.
Under such circumstances,
there was prejudice.
(Brooks, supra, at 801.)
A recent Arizona case found the Utah Court's reasoning in Crawford v. Manning, supra, sound and relied thereon in reaching the same result as the Utah Court did in
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Crawford.

In Wasko v. Frankel, 569 P.2d 230

(Ariz, 1977),

which, like the instant case, involved a claim for medical malpractice, the trial court declined to excuse a
prospective juror challenged for cause, after he had made
statements indicating he was biased.
one of his peremptory

chall~nges

The plaintiff used

to remove the juror.

The court held that such circumstances prejudiced the
plaintiff and necessitated a new trial.

In so holding

that Court said:
Peremptory challenges form an effective
method of assuring the fairness of a jury
trial.
Hence, forcing a party to use his
peremptory challenges to strike jurors who
should have been stricken for cause deprives the litigant of a substantial right.
(Wasko, supra, at 232.)
In the instant case, as in Crawford, supra, Moore,
supra, and Wasko, supra, the challenged prospective juror
clearly should have been removed for cause but the trial
court

fa~led

to do so.

And, as in the above cases, the

Plaintiff was forced to "waste" one of his peremptory
challenges to "accomplish that which the trial court should
have done."

The Plaintiff was prejudiced as a result and

must be granted a new trial.
When the appellant argued the motion for a new trial
and pointed out the error of the trial court concerning
the failure to dismiss this juror for cause, the court took
the position that appellants did not ask for a hearing or
trial when the challenge was made against Mrs. Eddins for
cause (R. 553).

Such a hearing was in fact held in the
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trial court's chambers, testimony was taken, and that
testimony was certainly sufficient to demonstrate the
prospective juror's bias and prejudice.
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THE TRIF-_L JCDGE ERP.ED IY REQCIRI~JG THE PL,'.1.HiTIFF TC
PROVE HIS c;._sE

CONCER~iDfG

WP.ICH GOVERNED DEFENDAN':'.''
STRICT LOCALITY RULE,

THE ST_:'.\.NDARD OF '1EDIC'1.L 0.PE

s

CONJ::;UCT ,-0.CCORDn:c TO THE

RATHER THAN THE SIMILAR LOCALITY

RULE.

During the course of the trial, counsel for the plaintiff calle:
Charles Dyson, of san Die<;o and Los Angeles, California, an eminently we);.
qualified heart-lung by-pass pump machine technician, as an expert in the
use of said machine.

Testi.rrony was elicited showing the witness to be an

expert, l<nowledgable in the minimum standard of care in respect to the use
of the said pump machine in 1972 in localities similar to Salt Lake City,
Utah.

Plaintiff's counsel propounded a series of questions to the witness

concerning the l'linimum standards in locales si..'Tli.lar to Salt Lake City, but
upon ob_-:ections from defense counsel, the witness was not allowed to test!'
to these s-t::andards. (R. 1171-1179.) Although the trial court explicitly
refused to give a reason for not allowing the witness to respond (R. 1172,
1173), it is apparent, fran the defense counsel's voir dire of the 1vitness

that the court refused to apply the "si.niilar locality" rule to expert test:

rrony and

instead tenaciously and

Wl thout

justification imposed the "str:~

locality" rule.
The courts of the United States have used four basic approaches :
establishing the standard of care to be required of physicians and surgeon:
They have variously required that such practitioners exercise the skill

arc

care of physicians ~ good standing in ( 1) the defendant's same locality
(strict locality rule); (2) the defendant's same general neighl:xxJ-:oo:l (sa.re
general neighborhocd. rule); (3) localities similar to defendant's

(simi~ar

locality rule); or (4) the medical profession (national standard rule).
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.onnot., 37 .;-... L.R. 3d 420 (1971); D. Louisell and H. Williams, 1 Medical
'lalpractice, 8.06 (1973).
The "strict l=ality" rule was favorably adopted by some early courts
in this country.

Baxter v. Snow, 79 Utah 817, 2 P.2d 257 (1931).

At the tirre

of its first adoption, there was a rational basis for the application of such
a rule, in wany instances.

?.t a t~ when carmunication and travel was more

primitive, when there were fewer medical schools and they were located in a
few large cities, and a majority of doctors were general practitioners who
were isolated frcrn rrajor medical centers, it was unrealistic to scrutinize
the standard of care of_ such local-cormrunity general practitioners by use of
experts who were unaware of the limitations within that carrnunity.

For an

expert frcrn a rrajor medical facility to sit in judgment of a local doctor
having limited facilities and little, if any, access to the most recent
developnents at the major facilities,cou.1 d result in sane injustice.
Happily, times have changed. Travel and carmunication has vastly
improved over the years and rredical science has rrade great advancerrents.
Whole new areas of medical knowledge have developed into specialized fields.
Most, if not all, experts receive their advanced expert training frcrn rrajor
rredical facilities.

There is alrrost instant ccmnunication anong practicing

experts of advancernents and discoveries made in their respective fields
through professional journals and saninars.
certification.

Experts regularly seek national

In such an atmosphere, the application of a strict locality

rule IIBkes no sense.

Experts practicing in their discipline all have access

to the same knowledge, techniques and advancerrents, andany qualified expert
is in a pcsition to know what is acceptable practice within the field of
expertise in question and what is not.

Certainly any physician who is

practicing in a field as specialized as cardiac by-pass surgery in a najor
city such Sponsored
as Salt
Lake, and holds himself out as a nationally-trained and
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l:oard certified expert shoulQ. not te insulated from the just criticism

c:

his qualified fellow experts ·,fho practice at sisrJ.lar redical centers.
The rra.jority of jurisdictions in the United States have lcr.g
erribraced a test which holds a defendant practitioner to the standard of ,,
and care ordinarily observed by other physicians in good standing in tf.€
defendant's same or a si.'Tlilar locality.

f.nnot. 37 F..L.R. 3d. 420 426 (i:·

King and Coe, The Wisdan of the Strict Locality Rule, 3 Ealt. L. Rev. 221.
222 (1974).

Similar locality is defined not by socioeconomic and gec<;r2r:;

factors but by the sin'J.larity of rredical factors such as medical scl:ools,
teaching hospitals and research and laboratory facilities in the lcx:aliti:
to te canpared.
1962);

~son

See C=k v. Lichbalu, 144 So. 2d 312 (Fla, Dist. CT. J.fp.

v. Veeni:::oer, 252 Mich. 660, 234 N.W. 170 (1931); Cavallero

SJ:-,arc, 54 R.I. 67, J.21 A.2d 669 (1956); Teig v. St. John's Eosoital, 63
Wash 2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963).

See also 40 Ford.'larn L. Rev. 435, 439

(1971); 14 Stan. L. Rev. 884, 890 (1962).
~he

following is a particularly good description of the proper

factors to be considered in detennining an expert's qualifications under'::·
similar locality rule:
"The rrodern view of a rrajority of courts is that a rredical
expert is free to testify in a rra.lpractice case if ris
camrunity or other camiunities with wrich he is familiar
rear sufficient similarity to that of the defendant. A.rid
in determining sii.11ilari ty the courts will not now lock to
such socioeconanic facts as population, type of econany,
and incane level but to factors rrore directly relating to
the practice of medicine. In the rra.in, an expert
practicing in a locality having medical facilities
comparable to those existing in the defendant's ccxmrunity
is permitted to testify concerning the standard of care
governing the defendant. ***The nurnl:er and quality of
hospitals, laboratories and medical schools are typical
=nsiderations . Of course +:he r_ature of the carrmmi ty in
which tre witness currently practices is irrelevant i f he
happcJis also to possess fa.ntlliarity with standards in the "
defendant's locale or in areas sufficiently sirrilar to it.
Waltz. 18 I€Faul L. Rev. 408 at 415.
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The atove rule is not foreign to the traditional notion of justice
ir. tort law.

.~ Justice Crockett r,:ointed out in the recent case of SWan

v. Lamb, Gtah, 584 P.2d 814 (1978), the proper application of the "similar
locality" rule is "but a specialized application of the standard of conduct
so universally i.nipJsed bf the law: of requiring the degree of care which the
ordinarY, reasonable and prudent person would observe under the sarre or
sinUlar circumstances." Swan v. Lamb, supra at 819.

Thus, experts practicing

in tJ-e sarc,e field of expertise, having access to the sane fund of knowledge,
receiving the same or

sirr~lar

training at similar medical facilities are

quite properly qualified to testify concerning the applicable standard of
care.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of Riley v. Layton,

329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964), sane fifteen years ago, in applying Utah law,
erl'braced tJ-e "similar locality" rule.

Justice Crockett, in

swan

v. Lamb,

supra, indicated that the Tenth Circuit was correct in doing so.
The facts of the instant case clearly call for the application of
the similar locality rule.
York City

( R.

836 ) ,

national standards of care.

The defendant, Dr. Parrish, was trained in New
and he holds himself out as practicing by
He was Board Certified to meet minimum national

standards of practice and carpetency in 1957 (Depo. #1, p. 6).

The basis of

cardiovascular surgerf in Salt Lake City is not dependent upon what thoracic
surgeons do in Salt Lake City alone.

Dr. Parrish claims he has taken the

usual steps to keep abreast of rredical developnents fran all over the co\IDt.ry
and to conform his practice to those standards.

Ee is a member of several

national societies of heart doctors, including the Society of Thoracic
Surgeons, the hnerican College of Chest Physicians, the J.rrerican College of
Cardiology and the Trudeau society (Depo. #1, p. 5).

He is also a member of

the .'\merican ~'edical Association and of the various regional rredical groups
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
\CePJ. #1,Sponsored
p. 5).
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In order to keep up in this field, he subscril:es to the l\nnals

--------

Thoracic Surgery; Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Suraerv; Chest·
----...o•

Circulation; Mierican Journal of Cardiolooy; and the Archives of suraerv .
.A.11 of these publications are edited and distributed on a national l:Bsis

to sirni_lar doctors throughout the '=untry.
The ~tandards of practice of doctors in New York City and other,
of the country are not foreign to Dr. Parrish; he has attended post-grad\(
=urses at fl'.ount Sinai Eospital in New York City (IRpo. 1±1, p. 9), as

·~l:

in Bennuda (IRpo. #1, p. 9), and in places all over the country and out c'

=untry (D=po. #l, p. 9) •
He. has observed the practice of cardiovascular surgery using a
by-pass purrp at hospitals in New York City at Roosevelt Hospital, New Yor:.
Hospital, and Mount Sinai Eospital, and at hospitals in Texas and in vane
parts of California.

(R. 840, 841.)

His observations at these institut

were applied as a basis for his practice at !-Joly Cross Eospital (I::er::o. "L
pp. 14-15) .

Dr. Parrish holds himself out to be practicing at standards :

quality of care which were corrparable to the al:ove institutions (Cer::o. #L
pp. 14-15).
It is, thus, very obvious that Dr. Parrish has held himself om.
keeping abreast of the significant changes in the practice of surgery ty
taking advantage of the available medical knowledge from all over the co!J:
It is also apparent that the basis for his practice of medicine is not hi:
limited experience in Salt Lake City, Gtah.

Indeed, one could rationally

claim that a doctor who did not take advantage of the medical knowledge

a1:

experience in other areas in a field as sophisticated as cardiovascular
surgery would be negligent in not taking advantage of the available
knowledge.

¢c~

It is quite clear, then, that in applying the "rredical factor'

the courts consider with respect to the "sirnilar locality" rule, that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1
'

sirrilar ITEClical facilities, experience and training, and considering tr.at
Dr. Parrish practices in Salt Lake City at sane of the finest facilities in
the country, he ought to be held to a standard consistent with that of
other similarly well--<rualified corrpetent cardiovascular surgeons practicing at
sL'Tiilar facilities in similar corrmunities.
As indicated a!:ove, the appellant called Mr. Charles Dyson to

testify as to the standard of care in the use of a heart-lung by-pass pump
rra.chine.

Mr. Dyson is a highly qualified pump technician who has perforned

over L 500 "punip runs" during by-pass surgeries. (R. 1061.) He is a certified
i:;erfusionist by the American Society of Extracorp:ireal Technicians. (R. 1065.l
He has taught courses related to perfusion technology. (R. 1070.) He has

attended seminars and listened to speakers throughJut the country. (R. 1069-71.)
He

is familiar with perfusion technology throughJut the country and in Salt

Lake City. (R. 1011.) Nevertheless, the court imposed the strict locality
rule, which prevented this expert witness fran giving his opinion concerning
the standard of care in a similar locality.

Had the plaintiff's witness been

allowed to testify as to the standard of care in locales similar to Salt Lake
City, Utah, he would have given testirrony that would have shJwn that the
defendant doctor's care of the plaintiff fell far below the existing and
recognized standard of care in similar localities with respect to operation of
the heart-lung by-pass punip rra.chine.

By

refusing to allow st<Ch testirrony,

the plaintiff was prevented fran presenting to the jury the very heart of his
case.

'Ihe court's failure to allow the jury to judge the defendant doctor's

c2r2 of the plaintiff by the standard of care in similar localities 'Was
clearly prejudicial error.
Later in the trial, the appellant called another expert witness,
Dr. Charles Bailey.

Dr. Bailey and the respondent Dr. Parrish have l:oth

received training in New York. (R. 836, 1368-69.) Dr. Bailey is the authJr
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of a text on thoracic surgery (R. 1311), has over two hundred articles c:
thJracic and cardiac surgery to his credit. (R. 1313. ) P.is qualif icatio°'
set forth in the Statement of Facts.

(See also R. 1309-1322, etc.)

In spite of the fact that the respondent testified that he had nationwF

training and held himself out as sw;iscribing to national standards, and
despite the fact that the appellant ' s expert, Dr. Bailey, and the res!XJr,.
both received their training in New York, Dr. Bailey was not allowed to
testify as to the standard of care in similar l=ali ties.

Dr. Bailey

111:

eventually allowed to testify as to the standard of care practiced in Sa:·

Lake City as he could testify to some familiarity with the practice of
cardiovascular surgery in Salt Lake City.

P.owever, as he was not actuaL

engaged in medical practice in Salt Lake City, as were the defendant's
experts, Dr. Russell M. Nelson and Dr. Richard K. Hughes, Dr. Bailey's
testirrony about the ;ninirnum standard of care adhered to by Salt Lake
cardiovascular surgeons was, in all likelihocxl., viewed by the jurors as

!E

auth.Jr1tatl'ie than the defendant's Salt Lake City-based expert witnesses.
Much of the effectiveness of Dr. Bailey ' s testirrony was diluted by requi:.
foundational questions which tended to sh.Jw minirral actual experience ar.c
familiarity with the same locality,

~

.a Yis. the Salt Lake City, Utah, a:

The net effect of the enployrrent of the sarre l=ality rule was
that the respondent's expert witnesses testified to a much lower standari
care and tended to better qualify by having more experience in the Salt~
City area, as they had actual practice within the area.
In the recent case of Swan v. Lamb, Utah, 584 P.2d 814 (19781.

this Court held it reversible error to apply the "sarre locality" rule
the "similar locality" rule should have teen applied.
case. are very similar.

w'r£

Both cases dealt with highly specialized areas

medical
expertise
for
wereby the
national
standards:
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1

The facts in the ·

spinal surgery, and in this case it is cardiovascular by-pass surgery.

In

t:oth cases experts were offered who were highly regarded nationally-renowned
surgeons.

In both cases the experts had had wide experience concerning the

practice of their specialty throughout the country.

In both cases the

defendant doctors were practicing at and associated with rrajor rred.ical
facilities in salt Lake City, facilities that are highly regarded throughout
the country.

The reasoning of the Court in

Swan

is just as applicable to the

instant case:
"There is no reason to hold that doctors in salt Lake City
who profess to be experts in the field of surgergy or
medicine should not be held to the standards of care
exercised by experts in the same field in cities of
=mparable size and throughout the rred.ical profession."
Swan, supra at 817.
In

that opinion, Justice Ellett went on to say:
"OUr quality of rredical care in Utah rates with the best
in the nation. Our hospitals are arrong the finest with
the rrost recent technology, and the rredical =llege at
the University of Utah enjoys an outstanding reputation.
In addition, doctors practicing their profession here
come fran various medical =lleges throughout the
nation. Medical journals are available nationally as
are seminars and workshops. There is no need for
doctors here to have a lower standard of care than that
of other doctcrs who are practicing in similar localities.
Indeed, it is doubtful that any physician in the State of
Utah would be willing to admit that his skill and
knowledge is not equal to any other physician trained in
his field, or that his ability is less than that of
doctors trained and practicing in other cities."
Swan, supra at 817.

The trial court's refusal to allow Dr. Bailey to testify as to the standard
of care of practicing cardiovascular surgeons in similar commmities and
Mr.

Charles Dyson concerning the standard of care in similar commmities

in the use of by-pass pump rrachines constituted prejudicial error.

J..s

~. the trial court's error calls for a reversal and a new trial.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-27-

in

POINT III
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
FAILED TO ALLOW OBJECTION'S CONCERNING JURY INSTRUCTIONS Tr
BE MADE DIRECTLY TO THE COURT.
A.

Objections must be l:oth tlirely and specific.

The trial court did not allow the plaintiff to make known to the
court his objections to jury instructions, but rather required the objectio:
be made to the court rep::lrter.
Rules 46 and 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure outline the:,
procedure for making objections to jury instructions.

Under Rule 46 it is:.

longer necessary to make fonna.l exceptions concerning clallred error in jury
instruction.

'imat Rule 46 does require is that a party make "known to the

court" his obJection and his grounds therefore.

Rule 51 adds the further re

quirerrent that the objection must be rrade before the instr.ictions are given
the jury, if the instructions are to be given in writing, or at least tefon
jury retires, if the instructions are to be given orally.

1

Rule 51 further:

plifies the requirerrent of Rule 46 by mandating that objections to instruct
not only must be rrade, but must be rrade with specificity.

Thus for any clar

error regarding jury instructions, (1) an objection must clearly be rrade, Ii
the objections must be rrade in a tirrel y rranner, and ( 3) the objection must
specifically state the grounds of the objection.

Failure to make a t.irrely,

specific objection to a clallred e=or in the instructions will ordinarily le'
in the appellate court' s refusal to review the clallred e=or.

Cordner

.0

Inc. 15 Utah 2d 86, 387 P.2d 685 (1963); In re Richards, 5 Utah 2d 106, 29i:
542 (1956), Johnson v. Sirrons, Utah, 551, P.2d 515 (1976).
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B.

Purp::>se of the Rule.

When Rules 46 and 51 are read together it is quite clear that what
is irrp:Jrtant is not the taking of a formal exception but iraking known to the
trial =urt the exact reasons of the objections at a tirre when an error can be
corrected.

In

speaking to the purpose of the rule requiring timely, specific

objections to the trial court's giving or refusing to give certain jury instruction, the Utah Suprerre Court has stated:

One of the purp::>ses in requiring counsel to rrake objections
to instructions in the trial court is to bring to the
attention of the court all clairred errors in the instructions
and to give him an opportunity to correct them if he deems it
proper. Einployers Mut. Liability v. Allen Oil Co., 123 Utah
251, 258 P.2d 445 (1953) at 450.
And in Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185 (1954), the court em-

phasized the need to keep the trial as free from error as possible by rraking a
proper, tirrely and specific objection so that the trial court can correct any
error:

Generally appellate courts will not review a ground of
objection not urged in the trial court. The duty is
incumbent upon counsel to give the trial court the
opportunity to correct the error before asking the
appellate court to reverse a verdict and a judgrrent
thereon. Pettingill, supra, at 186.
M:::lst, if not all, jurisdictions in this country, have adopted procedural rules
similar to Rules 46 and 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring
objections to jury instructions to be timely and specific so that the trial
judge can correct any error and thereby avert a mistrial or unnecessary appeal.

See, for example, Michie v. Calhoun, 84 Ariz. 270 336 P.2d 370 (1959); In~
Site for Civic Center, 54 Wash. 2d 387, 341P.2d148 (1959); Tapia v. Panhandle
Steel Erectors, Co., 78 N.M. 86, 428 P.2d 625 (1967); Lathrop v. Smith, Nev.,
288 P.2d 212 (1955);

Phillips v. Konornic, 159 Colo. 335, 411 P.2d 238 (1966);
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P.2d (1964): _Robinson v. Kathryr:, 23 Ill. .?>.pp. 5 2d, 161 N.E. 2d 477 (!gs
Rule 51 o"E the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

a ft er which

~.~

51, URCP, is patterned, requires that objections be timely and specific.
ccmrenting on the purpose of the rule, Professor Wright, in his treatise,
of Federal Courts (3rd E.d.), at

p.

465, states:

Rule 52 precludes a claim of error for giving an irrproper
instruction, or failure to give a proper one, unless an
objection has been taken, stating distinctly the arounds
of the objection, before the jury retires. Thus the
judge is made aware of the supposed defect in the instructions while he still has an opportunity to correct it.
And in 5A M:x:Jre's Federal Practice, paragraph 51.04, it states:
The Rule does not require fornali ty, and it is not important
in what form an objection is rrade or even that a fonral
objection is ~ade at all, as long as it is clear that the
trial judge understood the party's position; the purpose of
the Rule is to inform the trial judge of possible errors so
that he may have an opportunity to correct them.
(at 2521)
C.

The purpose of Rules 51 and 46 is undermined i f the trial cr.

refuses to listen to counsel's proper objections.
It is clear fran the above that what is contemplated by Rules 5'
46 is an exchange between opposing counsel and the trial judge so that t!t
judg-e can be fully informed by counsel of their respective opinions cancer
claill,ed error in the jury instructions.

Thus, having been fully appraise:

counsel, the court can make a rrore informed ruling and avert possible errc
In the instant case the trial court did not allow such an exchange to take

place.

Plaintiff was denied an opportunity to ~ake his objections to the c

instead, the court absented himself and required plaintiff to rrake his obJe
to the court reporter (R. 1827-39).
the purpose of Rules 51 and 4 6.

Such a procedure undermines the inter.t

Such a procedure is a mere forrrali ty, a te

exercise in making and preserving a record for appeal.
the trial as error-free as possible.

It does not work ti

It cannot work to inforrr. the trial ;

claimed error, for the judge is not present.

It does, in fact, result
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JJ.

antithesis of the intended effect envisioned in Rules 51 and 46: whereas Rules
51 and 46 atterrpt to eliminate fomality and work toward an error-free trial by

infonning the judge of possible error, the procedure followed in the present
case is a rreaningless fomality with no possibility of infoD!'ing the judge of
error.
In United States v. Certain Property Interests in Property in Borouah
of Brooklyn, 326 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1964), the court expressly recognized that
2ule 51, FRCP (upon which Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is patterned),
r.ot only requires that counsel state distinctly and specifically the grounds for

his objections, but also requires that the court afford counsel an opportunity
to explain its objections.

In so ruling, the court said:

We emphasize that 51 of the Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
pennits a party to state distinctly the !T'atter to which he
objects and the grounds of his objection. One significant
purpose of the rule is to allow the Lfrial7 judge to correct
any errors in his charge brought to his attention by any of the
parties. Unless the court pennits the parties to e?<Plain their
objections, this important purpose of Rule 51 cannot be
effectuated. (emphasis added) Certain Property Interests,
supra, at 118.
Rules 51 and 46 clearly intend that the trial court give to colll'lsel
an opportunity to explain to him their objections with such specificity that he
can fully understand that nature of any potential error.

Such a procedure is

the premise u_FOn which the requiranent of timeliness and specificity are based.
As noted al::ove in Employers Mutual Liability, supra, the Utah Court stated that:

One of the purposes in requiring counsel to !T'ake objections
to instructions in the trial court is to bring to the attention
of the court all clairred errors. (at 450, emphasis added)
How can colll'lsel "bring to the attention of the court all claimed errors" if the

court will not listen?

In

Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975), the trial

court refused to consider a claimed error with regard to jury instructions

because "there was no clear and correct statement to the court as to what
desired in that reaard." (at 358, emphasis added)
ll1struction Defendant
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again the court expressly recognized that to satisfy the Rules, the objections

must be niade "to the oourt".

Unless the ]'.Dtential error is actually "li'aC

known to the court", the resul ~intended by Rules 51 and 46 will be frusti

Courts in other jurisdictions who follow rules similar to our own Rules:

46 all clearly recognize that the ~ial court must actually be rrade aware
claiJred error.

In Tapia v. Panhandler Steel Erectors

Co., 78 N.M. 86, 4

625 (1967) the court said:

The specific vice in the instruction must be ]'.Dinted out so
as to leave no doubt that the a:>urt' s mind was actually alerte<
to it.
(at 632, emphasis added.)

In State v. Compton, 57 N.M. 227, 257 P.2d 915 (1953), the New

a:>urt further stated:
The prirl'ary pur[X)se of any objection of an instruction is,
of a:>urse, to alert the mind of the judge to the clailred
error contained in it. This fundarrental purpose must be
read into any and all rules on the subject.
(at 921, emphasis
added.)
Such a purpose is indeed fundarrental to Rules 51 and 46, but t
purpose is :ilnp::lssible to carry out if, as in the instant case, the trial
refuses to have his mind alerted.

In Saxton v. Harris, 395 P. 2d 71 (Ala

the Alaskan Suprerre Court stated:
The pur[X)se of this rule is to enable the trial judge to
avoid error by affording him an op[X)rtunity to rorrect his
charge before it goes to the jury. The dictates of the rule
are satisfied only if the judge is clearly niade aware of the
alleged error in an omission from the instructions.
(at 73,
emphasis added.)
See also Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 397 P.2d 529 (1964); Lathrop v.

288 P.2d 212 (Nev. 1955); Lucero v. Torres, 67 N.M. 10, 350 P.2d 1028 (1

It is clear from the above that the dictates of Rules 51 and 4
UCRP are not satisfied unless a:>unsel make their objections in a tirreiy
specific manner.

It is equally clear that the trial a:>urt must listen t

objections, weigh them carefully, and rorrect any error in tine to avoic
necessary
appeals
andFunding
retrials.
In bythe
iristant
case,
Plaintiff att.enl?i:t
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fully comply with Ru2.es 51 and 46, but the procedure followed by the trJ

by absenting himself when the objections ~re rra.de, denied the Plaintiff the

opp::>rtunity to explain his objections as required by the rules, and in so doing,
denied Plaintiff a fair trial.
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POINT IV
THE TRL"l.L COURT ERRED WITH RESPECT TO THE FOLLOWDJG JCJ
INSTRUCTIONS:
A.

The Trial Court erred in giving Instuction No.

dealing with the standard of care and who may testify

then~

The second paragraph of jury instruction No. 12

~

as follows:
The only way you may properly learn such
a standard, and thus determine whether or
not the doctor conformed to it, is through
evidence presented during this trial by
physicians testifying as expert witnesses
who knew or (sic) that standard as it existed at that time.
This instruction

ins~ructs.the

members of the jury that

on~

testimony af a phvsician can be relied on to determine the st
of care.

While such is quite often the case in medical malpr

litigation, it is not always so.

As more and more sophistica

machines are employed in medical procedures, technicians who

trained experts in the use of such machines are used to opera
them.

In the present case Mr. Charles Dyson, a highly qualifie
heart-lung by-pass pump machine technician testified for the
tiff concerning the physiology involved with the by-pass
machine and the proper use of said machine.

pu~

Mr. Dyson is qui

clearly a highly knowledgeable expert in the field of by-pass
pump machines.

(R. 1081) By instructing the jury that only th
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testinDny of expert physicians could be relied upon to establish the standard
of care, the jury was erroneously mislead into rejecting out of hand all
testinDny given by the appellant's by-pass pump machine technician.

Such an

L~struction prejudicially ha.rrred the appellant and denied him a fair trial.

B.

The Trial Court erred in that Instruction No. ll failed to

include essential eleirents of the appellant's theory of the case.
The second paragraph of Instruction No. 11 states as follows:
The plaintiff claims that the defendant failed to
exercise such required care, skill and diligence
in the operation of the heart-lung by-pass machine,
or in failing to properly train and supervise his
perfusion pump technician.
Such a staterrent is a wholly inadequate staterrent of the appellant's claims.
The appellant has the right to have his theory of the case presented to the jury,
but such an instruction, which purr:orted to set forth the appellant's claims
failed to do so.
The appellant clailred that the pump was not properly operated, but
llDre irrportantly, the appellant clailred that the respondent and his purrp technician failed to properly rronitor the appellant while using the purrp rrachine.

It

is quite conceivable that the jury found that the pump was physically operated
within the standard of care, but had they been so instructed, there was sufficient
testinDny that they would have likely found that certain necessary precautions
were not taken, arrong which were the following:
l.

Failure to properly obtain arterial and venous blood gas

tests throughout the operation;
2.

Failure to properly rronitor the patient's terrperature.

The court failed to instruct on the atove important theories of the
appellant'.s case, and such failure oonstituted prejudicial error.
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c.

The trial court erred in failinq- to

c::ri· \re
-

+-he
w'
apf.:e 11ant's

requested instructions Nos. 6 and 7.
The appellants requested the following instructions regardir:
use of depositions in trial:
Appellants requested Instruction

No. 6:

In the present action certain testirrony has been
read to you by way of deposition. You are instructed that you are not to discount this testirrony for the sole reason that it corres to you in
the form of a deposition. It is entitled to t.11e
sarre consideration on your part with reference to
its weight as i f the witness had r:ersonally apJ:>eared.
Appellants requested Instruction No. 7:
In the present action certain testirrony has been
given to you by way video television. You are
instructed that you are not to discount this
testirrony for the sole reason that it corres to
you in the fonn of a video television. It is
entitled to t.'le sarre consideration on your part
with reference to its weight as if the witness had
personally appeared.
For various reasons it is sometimes necessary to use deposit.le
trial rather than live testirrony.

It is likely that rrembers of the jur1' c

tend to discount testirrony by deposition in comparison to live testi.Jror,y ::
witnesses they can see and hear.

However the ;:>arty offering testirrony t;

deposition has t.11e right to have such testirrony weighed in the sarre ITBJll'.e:
live testirrony.

Testirrony by deposition should not be given greater or ;"

consideration simply because it is testirrony by deposition and the jury s:
properly be so instructed.
In the instant case t.11e appellant offered testirrony by dejXlsit
recorded both in written fonn and in video television form.

The al:xlve re>

instructions were particularly irrp:Jrtant vii th resr:;ect to U1e video dep::is;~
as such a rrianner of presenting evidence is a rather new and novel proceGC:'
It is quite likely that rrernl::ers of tJ1e jur;, unless explicitly instrxw:
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The appellant was entitled to an instruction on the use of deposision testirrony, and the courts failure to so instruct prejudiced the appellant.
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POINT V
THE DEFENDANT DOCTOR HAVING REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE ANY HE:
TEXT AS AUTHORITATIVE, THE TRIAL COuRT ERRED I:J REFCSI:;:
ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT TO AUTHENTICATE AUTHORITATI~:
Near the outset of the trial, the plaintiff called the defer,c.;:
Doctor Parrish, as an adverse witness.

During the course of plaintiff':

examination of the defendant doctors, i::>laintiff' s counsel questioned fa
defendant doctor concerning medical text books authored by several ernins·
heart surgeons.

(R. 841-46)

The defendant doctor evasively refused to;:

ledge any of the experts or their medical texts.

Indeed t..'Je trial cour:

sistent'_-1- sustained objections to foundational questions which were
goinq t:: ::.:-.e auti:entication of medical texts.

(R. 841-46)

c~~

Counsel for:

plainti:f :::-e::ieatedly attempted to lay a foundation concerning several r.er
but each time the trial =urt refused to allow such questions.

CoW1Sel'

plaintiff offered to niake a proffer of proof =ncerning authoritativene::
the medical texts in questions.

(R. S46)

Nevertheless the court refuse:

allow plaintiff's counsel to pursue such a line of inquiry even thougn ::
cross-e.."<amination of the defendant doctor.
Later in the trial, counsel for plaintiff atteit\)ted to aut:hentJ:
medical text books by testirrony from plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Char.
Bailey.

(R. 1379-1383)

The trial court repeatedly refused to allow que:·-

as to the auth61ticity of prominent medical texts.

(R. 1379-83)

Counse:

plaintiff t..'len made the following proffer:
MR. DIXON: Your Honor, the plaintiff v.Duld like to proffer ~,:
Court at this time that Dr. Bailey would have authenticated a number 0 ~
textbooks related to bypass surgery, extracorporeal circulation, surger,
chest, and related matters that would all be textbooks which Dr· &nleJ :'
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r.o

l

authenticate as being regarded as reliable authorities by himself and other
physicians and that are generally accepted in the field as accurately reflecti
the state of the art as of the tines that these were published.
ng
The plaintiff would have-or, the plaintiff proposed to authenticate
them through this witness so that the textbooks could be used in cross-examination of defense witr_iesses l.!1asmuch as it's quite apparent that Dr. Parrish is
unwilling to authenticate anything.
And Dr. Parrish has no textbooks of any =ent value, m::ist of his
text]::x::Dks relating back to before 1960.
I'll be happy if the Court would like to bring in all of the textbooks
and--

THE ffiURI': The proffer is in the record.
t.he sarre in connection with the matter, Mr. Dixon.

The Court's ruling rerrains

It is quite apparent from the record that counsel for the plaintiff
intended to use authoritative rredical texts for purposes of cross-examination of tn
defendant doctor and the defendant doctor's experts.

The refusal of the defendant,

Dr. Parrish, to authenticate any of the standard texts on heart by-pass surgery
is clearly docurrented.

In the face of such recalcitrance, counsel for plaintiff

attempted to authenticate these rredical texts through his own expert, but was
not allowed to do so.

Had the appellant been allowed to use the texts in question 1_

on cross-examination, he would have shown that the respondent doctor was negliyent
in performing,as he did, the by-pass surgery on Mr. Jenkins.

The trial court's

refusal to allow counsel for the appellant to question the respondent concern.inc;
the authenticity of medical texts was prejudicial error.

Likewise, the trial

l.

court' s refusal to allow appellant to then authenticate rredical texts by his
own expert witness constituted prejudicial error and denied the appellant a
fair trial.
The traditional rule is that rredical texts are not admissible to prove
the truth of

staterrents contained therein, but the use of rredical texts in

cross-examining rredical experts is aJ.rrost universally recognized.
Evidence, (3rd ed. 1940) §§1690-1700;

6 Wigm::ire,

M:Connick, Evidence, §296; 60 ALR. 2d, 77

Even in the states still clinging to the traditional approach, an expert
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:>.

·rredical texts or treatises as aG.thori tati ve.

If t.".e expert recugnizes

t'.;

or treatise as authoritati'1e, that text or treatise may then be used to.
'I

diet, impeach and discredit the witness.
In the instant case, as pointed out al::ove, counsel for appell~·: ·
not even allowied to ask the respondent doctor, wr.o is an expert, fol1'lciat·
---------.:::.

questions as to the aut.1-1entici ty of certain rredical texts, let alone whet
r2sponC.ent doctor considered such texts to be authoritative.

(R. 841-8%

even under t.'ie strictest a;::iplicatior. of the traditional rule regarding

i.

c:,,

of rredical texts, the trial court wrongfully and prejudicially cut off t.o
examination of the respondent doct'Jr.
Since t.lJ.e trial court effectively blocked all cross-2xaminatior.
respondent doctor by the use of rredical texts in that it allowed him to:::
to concede

w'.1et~'ier

a te}.'t was authoritative or not, counsel for the

plai1:.~

attempted ta au":.':.enticate the rredical texts through his own eXJ:.-'€rt witneso.
This t.'ie trial :::oel..-':.: re::used to allow, apparently ar;::ilying the traditiona:.
concerning the manner in which rredical texts may be authenticated.

A gre.o'

many courts are increasingly breaking away from strict a:;iplication of fr.2:
tional rule regarding authentication of rredical texts and their use inc::
examination of

rredical experts.

The United States Suprerre Court lons asc

rejected the rigid traditional approach in the case of Reil1': v. Pinkus, ::
U.S. 269 (1949).

In Reilly the appellant was not allowed to use for pur,x;

of cross-examination, certain rredical texts which were otherwise shown

tM

reliable, because the respondent's expert witnesses refused to authenuc.;::I
In granting a new trial, the Court said:
" ... I t has been pointed out that the doctors' expert
evidence rested on their general professional knowledge.
To some extent their knowledge was acquired from rredlcal.
textbcDks and publications, on which these experts placec
reliance. In cross-examination resVJi~-:::ent sought to
question these witnesses concerning staterrents in other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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respectable aut.lJ.ori ties. T'ne questions wiere not rermi

We think this.was an undue restriction on the right
to cross-exanune. It certainly is illogical, if not
actually unfair, to permit witnesses to give ex;:iert
opuuons based on l::x:::ok knowledge, and then deprive
the.party challe~ging such evidence of all opportunity
to interrogate tnem al:::out divergent opinions expressed
in other reputable l::x:::oks." (388 U.S. 269, 275)
A large number of state courts have, either by judicial decision or
state statute, rejected the strict application of the traditional rule and
adopted the !:Jrocedure of allowing cross-examination by use of rredical texts
authenticated
notice.

either by another expert witness or authenticated by judical

See, for exanple, Illinois:

Darling v. Charleston Corrrnunity

Hospital, 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E. 2d 253 (1965); Nebraska:
107 Neb. 821, 187 N.W. 73 (1922); Texas:

ll_ppls. 2d, 193 So. 2d 648 (1967).

Oliverius v. Wisks,

William Caireron Conpany v. D:>wning,

Ct. Civ. Appls., 147 S.W. 2d, 963 (1941); Washington:
431, 392 P.2d 317 (1964); Florida:

r~rial

Dabroe v. Rhodes, 64 Wash.

City of St. Petersburg v. Ferguson, Dis. Ct.
In addition, the Hawaii oourt has indicated

that it will establish such a rule when the issue is properly brought before it:
Tittle v. Hurlbutt, 53 H. 526, 497 P.2d 1354; and Michigan has indicated a willingness to allow authentication by judicial notice:
200

N.'.J.

statute:

2d 196.

Jones v. Bloom, 388 Mich. 98,

The following states have adopted the nore flexible approach by
l~ew Mexico (N.M. Stat. §20-4-

i-Jevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. §51.255 (1973));

803(18)(1973));
(18) (1975));

Maine

(Me.

R. Evid. 803(18)(1976));

Kansas (Kan. Stat. §60-460(cc) (1964)).

Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. §908.0.
The federal courts allow

cross-examination by use of rredical texts which have been authenticated by other
expert wit.cesses or by judicial notice.

Federal Rules of Evidence 803(18) and

both the ~.ad.el Code of Evidence (Rule 529) and t..'"1e Uniform Code of Evidence
(Rule 63(31)) have embraced such an approach.
The traditional justification for not allowing the freeer use of rredical
texts, especially to prove the truth of the matter as asserted, is that quotations
from texts constitutes hearsay.

In

turn, the principal concern about hearsay
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l · abl
evidence in general is that it is unre
e.

the case of authoritative uedica

texts, the concern al::x:Jut reliability is substantially negated by other'"
guards.

These include the fact that the authors of texts have no · t _
in eres:

the outcome of the litigation at hand and are therefore unbiased; the :u:
are professional persons who write for their peers and are concerned al:xi1.:
their reputation for accuracy and·· authenticity arrong their peer group; t
texts in question must be authenticated in the courtr=m by qualified e;'¥.
As a result of these considerations many courts allow, upon authenticahc:

medical texts to be used on direct evidence to prove the truth of the mt
asserted.

See, e.g. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803 (18); Nevada Rev;;,

Statutes §51.255 (1973); New Mexico Statute

§20-4-803 (18) (1973); Maine P.

of Evidence 803 (18) (1976); Alabama Code Title 7 §413 (1960).

On balance, .

t.'1e safeguards to reliability are considered, the advantages gained in er£:
the veracity of expert witnesses through the use of medical texts, far cut.
the ccnce:!:Tls a.tcut reliability.

Ct:a!: has already adopted a statute t.'1at allows for historical wvr

books of science or art etc. to be accepted as prima facia evidence of far.
general notoriety (§78-25-6 Utah Code Annotated).

One of the requirerrents

this code section is that the author of the texts in question must have Ce.
"indifferent between the parties [to the litigation] ".
qualify.

Medical .texts oer.i.

Additionally medical texts are works of science.

Ct:her states ''·

identical statutes, have alloY."ed technical medical information to be intrcc
by virtue of such a statute.

In Julian v. Barker, et al. 75 Idaho 415, 21:

719 (1954), interpreting Idaho Code §9-402 (1948), the court allowed affill''
evidence to be submitted concerning a drug manufacturers instructions alxJcc
use of a certain medicine; and in In re Sultan, 83 Id. 265, 361 P.2d 793 1 ~
. 1 texts in
· hi s
t.'1e court allowed a w1. t:..'l.ess to quote rredica

t:

,_; ,,,,.,n"

_es"-"-''~

1 •

Unde:

M:Jntana Revised Code §93-1101..:.3 (1964) the court in ~us~
District, 565 P.2d 632 (19771 allowed as evidence a U.S. Geological re0Jr'
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the aJ:;ove example, evidence ITDre technical than general notcriet:z was allowed.
AlabaITB, under a code section similar to Utah Code Annotated §78-25-6 has
long allowed the use of rredical texts, in ooth direct and cross-examination.
These jurisdictions have recognized the great advantages gained in checking
the veraci t:z of exi:;ert witnesses by allowing the freeer use of rredical texts
in direct and cross-examin.ation and have used statutes similar to or identical

with Utah' s to achieve such an end.
In the instant case, the respondent doctor was allowed tc insulate

himself fran effective cross-examination by the use of authoritative and reliabl'
texts by sirrply refusing tc concede that any texts were authoritative.

The

trial court aided the respondent's efforts to insulate himself by refusing tc
allow the plaintiff's expert, Dr. Bailey, tc authenticate rredical texts.

In so

doing, the court unwarrantedly and unfairly restricted the appellant's ability
to cross-examination the respondent doctor and his rredical expert witnesses,
and in so doing denied the appellant a fair trial.
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POINT VI
REVERS IBLE ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY 'I'HE TRIAL COCRT IN
ALLOWING A SURPRISE W~TNESS,
TESTIFY,

DR.

RUSSELL M. NELSON, TO

IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PRE-TRAL ORDER.

IT WAS

ALSO REVERSIBLE ERROR ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT TO
ALLOW DR.

NELSON TO RENDER AN OPINION ON MATTERS OTHER

THAN REBUTTAL TO THE TESTIMONY OF CHARLES DYSON.

A.

Dr. Russel M. Nelson, was called as a surprise wi. tness by -

defense, and in so doing, not only surprised unfairly the Plaintiff, but\·.
the pre-trial order.
In anticipation of the trial of the above-entitled rratter,

a ,r,

ccnfero...nce was held before the Honorable Judge Ernest Baldwin, in his char"
on September 12, 1977.

Although no written rrerrorandum of Judge Baldwin'>:

tri.h order was prepared, he nevertheless did make an order requiring eacr
party to disclose all witnesses who w::iuld be called at trial.
Affidavit of attorney for plaintiff paragraph 3a.

(R. 494,49i;

This fact is further :X:

by staterrents of counsel during the trial (R. 1737-1740).

The appellant disclosed witnesses pursuant to the ;::ire-trial ort
did the respondent's counsel.

However, during the course of the trial, t"'

in contravention to the controlling pre-trial order, penni tted the restxinri
counsel to call an exi;:ert rredical witness, not disclosed at pre-trial, tot;
on direct examination.

As a result of this violation of the pre-trial di::

requirement, the Plaintiff was unfairly and prejudicially surprised, not r;
had the opportunity to make discover1, through deposition or other.vise, on
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witness.

In addition, the Plaintiff was prejudiced in that he did not have an

oppcrtunity to fully investigate Dr. Nelson's credentials and qualifications,
analyze the theories of his expert testirrony, nor procure rebuttal witnesses.
Even at the tirre of the comrencerrent of the trial, when t.1-ie court required of

tx:Jth appellant' s and respondent' s counsel the

naJTeS

of the witnesses they

intended to call, counsel for the respondent did not include

Nelson in his list of witnesses (R. 659 and R. 660) .

or.

Russel M.

Consequently the judge

never inquired as to whether rrembers of the jury knew of Dr. Russel M. Nelson
(R. 677). One of the evils that resulted is that there rray have been rrembers
of the jury who knew Dr. Nelson or who knew of him, and counsel had no opportunity to te appraised of this fact or make further inquiry into that rratter.

Bertram v. Harris, 423 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1967), presents a case very
s:Unilar to the present one.

In Bertram, a pre-trial order was made requiring

the parties to disclose witnesses, but as in the instant case, no written order

was issued.

During the trial, the appellant called a witness that had not been

disclosed as required by the pre-trial order.
to allow the witness to testify.

The trial court properly refused

The appellant appealed the court's ruling, but

upon review it was held that the witness was properly excluded..

The court held

that no fornal pre-trial order requiring the exchange of witness lists was
necessary.

As long as the pre-trial judge required the exchange of lists, such

an order, even i f not fornalized into a pre-trial order, controlled the calling
of witnesses at tiral.
In Fairbanks Publishing Conpany v. Fransisco, 390 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1964)

a pre-trial conference was held at which ti.Ire the parties were required to exchange witness lists.

At the ti.Ire of trial the Plaintiff attenpted to call

witnesses not included in the list as required.
objection.

The Defendant made a tinEly

The rratter was extensively argued in the trial court with the trial
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judge eventually ruling that either party could call witnesses other than those

The Alaskan Court held that such an

included in the pre-trial order.

abandorurent of the pre-trial order by the trial judge was error and the
defendant was prejudiced thereby.
In the instant case, the Plaintiff made a a:mplete disclosur;

all witnesses called by him, and made a tirrely objection at trial to th;
of witnesses not disclosed as required at the pre-trial ccnference
41).

(R, ;·

Dr. Nelson was not named as a witness by the defense and should nc:

been allrn.;oed to testify.

Dr. Nelson's testi.rrony unfairly and prejWi.ci:.._

surprised the appellant.

He had no cpportmity to prepare for such tes::..

examine Dr. Nelson's qualifications, obtain disccvery of Dr. Nelson's t:r.
or rrethods of practice, nor obtain rebuttal testi.rrony.

was a clear case of "trial by ambush,"

Dr. Nelson's teo:

the very thing pre-trial confere.

are designed to prevent.
3.

The trial ccurt erred in failing to restrict Dr. Nelson''

testi.'TOr.y to rebuttal to Mr. Charles Dyson's testi.rrony.
At the t.irre the defense called Dr. Russel Nelson to testify, :
appellent entered an objection based upon the grounds enurrerated al:ove.
1738-41) .
was argued.

A ccnference was held out of the hearing of t.tie jurf and the 1
The court ruled that Dr. Nelson v.Duld be strictly limited tr

rebuttal to the testi.rrony of Mr. Charles Dyson.

However, t.11e court fai:e

to restrict Dr. Nelson' s testi.rrony to rebuttal, and Dr. Nelson was, in ~':
allowed to give his opinion as to the entire question of the standard of!
and other matters

(R. 1735-47) .

It is well recognized that in the rare case that it be<XJireS

r<:J

to rrodify a pre-trial order at the tirre of trial for the purpose for pre'
a rranifest injusitce, the trial must impose restrictions to protect the
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pa;:ties.
1959).
(1963).

::Bnd v · 1'-ir Carrier Engine Service, Inc. , 263 F. 2d 948 (5th Cir.
See also '.'Jote, Federal Pre-trial Procedure, 51 Georgetown L.J. 309
Lri

Land v. Carrier,

~'

the court said:

''The Court does have the right. . . to relieve
counsel of pre-trial stipulations to prevent
rre.nifest injustice . . . but the =urt is responsible
for seeing that suitable protective terms or
conditions are i.mj:osed to prevent substantial and
real harm to the adversary. ***Whatever form it
takes, the protection must be as full as needed
to assure that the authorized change does not
subject the adversary to insuperable and irretrievable harm." at 953.
The trial court failed to so protect the appellant, as required.

After

having ruled that Mr. Nelson's testim:my would be limited to rebuttal to
Mr. Charles Dyson, he was, over objection (R. 1737-41), allowed to testify
as a general defense witness and was permitted to answer a hypothetical
question relating to the general liability of the defendant.

Such

testirrony was prejudicial to the appellant, and denied him a fair trial.
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TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THAT IT DENIED THE PLAINTIFF TEE
RIGHT TO ;o.. FULL AND FAIR CROSS-EX;o.JUN.:'.\TION.
-"'·

A party has a right to a full and fair cross-examination or.

all matters examined on direct ...
It is a l::esic rule of law that a party has the right to confrcr.:
cross-examination, any witness who is called to testify against him.

~

U.S., 282 U.S. 687 (1931); Resurrection Gold Min. Co. v. FortllI'.e Gold :tr..
129 F. 668 (8th Cir. 1904); State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 104J
(1927); McCormick on Evidence, 2d Ed. Sl9; Wiamore, Evidence S1367; 81 ;y,
2d, Witnesses S464.

For the past two hundred years, comron law judges ar.:

attorneys alike have regarded cross-examination as "an essential safeguar:
the accuracy and completeness of testirrony ... ".

~.cCormick, ~, §19,

ca.lls it the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of tr:.
and states further that "Cross-examination, not trial by jury, is the gro-2:
pe:rar.er.t contribution of the _;;nglo-.l\rrerican system of law to
of trial procedure."

Wigrrore, supra, 81367.

~rove

rret:I

Because of the inp:::lrtance oi

corss-examination as a vehicle for the discovery of truth in a judicial
:oroceedi~g,

virtually all courts of last resort in the United States reco:

cross-examination as a right and nor a mere privilege.

see e.g. Statev.

Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 (1927); Fahy v. Clark, 125

conn.

41,

3 A.2d 313 (1938); 81 .~.. Jr. 2d, Witnesses e464, n. 49, 50 & 51.
Utah courts have long recognized cross-examination to l::e a riglt
not a rrere privilege.

State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 (192'.

involved a criminal defendant who had teen given a suspended sentence.

At

subsequent hearing, the trial court set aside the suspended sentence r~
the defendant to serve his term.

l,t. the hearing to revoke his suspended
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~e the state ' s
-~er,tence, the defendar:t was not allowed to cross-ev~~'
~''-'-"

In overturning the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court said:

· tnesses.

Wl

"In a

judicial investigation the right of cross-examination is an absolute right and
no,t a mere privilege of the party against whom the witness is called."
v. Zolantakis, ~, at 1047.

More recent Utah decisions continue to affinn

that cross-examination is a right and not a mere privilege.
[.~estas,

~

see e.g. State v.

564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977).
While a party has a right to cross-examine any witness who gives

testi..rrony against him, the trial court is, of course, given a great deal of
discretion as to the scope of the cross-examination.

Alford v. U.S., 382

c.s. 687 (1930); State v. ZOlantakis, 70 Utah 2966, 259 P.1044 (1927); Weber.
Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 802 (1959).
This is necessarily so, as a trial judge must reasonably have control of the
order of proof, the length of trial, and the protection of witnesses from unduly
prolix cross-examination that serves little in the aid of the discovery of
truth.
Co.,

Alford v. U. s. , supra; Resurrection Gold Min. Co. v. Fortune Gold Min.

129 F. 668 (8th Cir. 1904).

Thus, even in jurisdictions such as Utah,

which follow the rule that only trose rratters examined on direct may be the
subject of cross-examination, trial judges rray, in their discretion, allow a
cross-examination to go into collateral rratters instead of requiring the
cross-examiner to call the witness as his own and elecit testirrony in the fonn
of direct testirrony.

Resurrection Gold Min., supra.

This is done quite

frequently, and such discretionary action on the part of the trial judge will
l::e overturned only for abuse of such discretion.

81 Arn. Jur. 2d Witnesses 8479.

Ihe trial judge rray also, in his discretion, limit the cross-examination of a
witnesses Sponsored
that serves
no apparent purpose other than to harass, rralign or
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•
rnaliciously discredit the wi.tr.ess . .:..lford v. U. .":., supra.

It has even~

held that the trial ccurt rnay, in his discretion, set a time li_n,it to

CQ':

the cross-examination of a witness, wnen the cross-exarrination has l::EcarE
unduly long, has not produced any isnp::irtant, new or qualifying facts,

ar.c.

does not appear that continued cross-examination along the line pursued

,1.

1

produce any new or qualifying fact that would be helpful to the jcry.
t-:.arris v. U.S., 350 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1965).

P.owever, since cross-exar:i:,

is such a p::iwerful and useful cteck on the veracity, accuracy and inipart::_
of the witness, it is generally stated that a trial judge should give
cross-exarniner wide latitude in his cross-exarPination.
Min. Co .. supra; .<U+=ord v. U.S., supra, at 219.

t~e

!"esurrection C-<lk

Certainly cross-eX2I11inat.:

sro:.:;ld :-1ot 0-e stepped ·,.,r.en it reasonably appears to be leading to the disC'.
of truth er

L~rtant

P.2d 630 (1953).

additional facts.

State v. Peek, 1 Ctah 2d 263, 26i

Clearly, it would be an abuse of discretion to halt crcs:

examination on material matters that the witness went into on direct.

~~

Pasin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959):
Am Jur. 2d Witnesses §478.

Indeed, the trial court has discretion to lil:r

the cross-examination only after the cross-examination on each rraterial~covered by the •Ni tness on direct.

Alford v. U.S. , ~, at 219.

To cut:

cross-examination on any material p::iint ccvered. on direct before it has ::eo
fully developed, or to forbid all cross-exam.nation on any rraterial fXJir.t ._,
was the subject of direct examination is plain error.
Ressurrection,

~;

,_,
2tate v. Zolantaiu.s_,
supra.

cases, rrandate a new trial.

."J.ford v.

T].

s. ,

l'J.ford, supra;

Such error

wi· 11,

in rost

supra, at 220; Fahy v · Cl§rt·

Conn. 41, 3 1'2d 313 (1938); McCormick on Evidence §19, at 46 (2d ecJ.).
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In

Alford v · U· S · ,

~'

the Suprerre Court overtUined the conviction

of the defendant tecause the trial court forl:::ade all cross-examination in a

lec;it.:. mate area of inquiry.

In

that case the trial court sustained the govern-

;'.'€P.t' s objection to all questions concerning a witness's place of residence .
.~fter enunciating the general principle that "Cross-examination of witness is
a :ratter of right," and that, "Lilt is the essence of a fair trial that
reasc~able

latitude 1Je given the cross-examiner ..• ," the court stated:
The extent of cross-examination wi.th resi;-ect to an
appropriate subject. of inquiry is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. It may exercise a
reasonable judgment in determining when the subject.
is exhausted. ***But here the trial court cut off
all inquiry on a subject. with respect to which the
defense was entitled to a reasonable cross-examination. This was an abuse of disc:cetion and prejudicial
error. (at 219 & 20).

illus, while the court has discretion to limit the extent of the cross-

eX2mination of any appropriate line of questioning on a particular subject
watter, it does not have the right to forbid all cross-examination on a
subject of appropriate inquiry, until it has teen fully and fairly covered.
In

Ressurection Gold Min. Co. v. Fortune Gold Min. Co., 129 F.

668 (8th Cir. 1904), that court extensively analyzed both the right of a
party to a full and fair cross-examination and the discretionary control of
the trial court with regard to the scoi;-e thereof.

During cross-examination

of plaintiff's witness, the trial court, in Ressurection, refused to allow a

question which '1ias directly related to facts testified to by the witnesses,
which, i f answered, may have proved the witness to have teen mistaken in his
direct testirrony.

On

appeal, counsel for plaintiff argued that permission

to answer such question was discretionary with the trial court and that
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refusal to allow the questior. v.-as r:c "!Guse of disc.::-etior..

"'."he c:rC'Jlt.

held otherNise, stating:
But a fair and full cross-examination of a witness
upon the subjects of his examination in chief is the
absolute right, and r.ot the rrere privilege, of the
party against whcrn he is called and denial of this
right is a prejudicial and fatal error. It is only
after the right has been fully and substantiallv
exercised that the allowance of the cross-exami~ation
becanes discretionar1 with the trial court.
Resurrection, supra, at 674.
The court, in Resurrection, goes on to consider the propriety.
going into :mtters on cross-ex-c.mination that were not part of the
testirrony in chief during direct examination.

'Nl.tr.eo:

The court points out tmt

this is done, the witness becorres the witness of the cross-exarnir.rng izIt is at this point that the trial court's reasonable discretion cares;:
play.

;..s the court states:

It is d~scretionary with the court to pennit the crossexaminer to rrake the W1. tness his own at the tisre he is
conductir.g the cross-examination, because the tL'11e and
the :earner of the trial are within the discretion of the
::ocrt. It is a.lso discretionary with the trial court to
penr~t leading questions to be put to a hostile witness
upon rQS direct examination. (at 675)
This, it is in this area t1:at the trial court properly exercises his reF
discretion.

When the speed and efficiency of the trial is enhanced by 2:

the cross-examiner latitude to go sanewhat beyond the witness's testi.rror.v
chief, the trial judge, wh:l is in the best position to know this, may aL:
This rule is ever. rrore succintly stated by Judge f-look in his concurring
opinion in Resurrection, supra.

P.e

states:

The position of Judge Thayer and the writer of this
opinion is that after a cross-examining party has
teen accorded all of this rights as limited by the
rule Llimiting cross-e~nation to the subject of
the direct exaJY!inatioDJ, whether the cross-examination rray then take a Wl.der sccpe or latitude is
generally a matter within the sound discretion of the
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trial court, and error is not camtitted unless such
a discretion is abused. ***That a trial court is given
a broad discretion in controlling the latitude of a
cross-€xamir,ation has become an axiom of the practice.
Eesurrection, supra, at 681. (errphasis added) See
also Judge Eook's full discussion of this point at
pages 681-684.
\~rule

the court rrakes it clear that great discretion is given the trial judge

to allow cross-€xamination beyond the scope of the direct, as long as the
cross-€X2I!'iner is pursuing subjects opened by the direct examination, the
right to a full and fair cross-€xarrination on each such subject is "invaluable,
and it should be carefully preserved."

Eesurrection, supra, at 675.

During tre course of the trial, the defendant called an expert
witness, Dr. Eussel

~1.

Nelson, M.r::., to testify as to the ccmnunity standard

of care wi t..'1 respect to the rroni toring of blood flow purrped by a heart-lung
T!lachine.

Dr. r::elson was th::Jroughly examined by counsel for defendant on

direct exa.'Tl.ination, as to that standard, including hypothetical questions
eliciting his opinion as to 'Nhat is and is not proper medical procedure, as
practiced by the doctors in this corrmunity, in relation to the proper rronitoring
of said rr.achine.

(Tr.

p. 1735-1747).

On

cross-€xarnination, counsel for the

plaintiff asked the following question:
Q.

Dr. Nelson, you've indicated that you r.ave an
opL.""lion based on the camruni ty standard. Did
you perfonn surgery in the sarre way that was
described in that hypothetical? (Tr. p. 1747).

Col.ll1sel for defendant objected on the grounds that the question was "irrelevant
and i.rmaterial."

such an objection is with::Jut rrerit.

As

is clear fran the

cases and auth::Jrities examined above, a party has a right to a full and
canplete cross-€xamination on all rraterial points examined on direct.
question objected to went to the heart of the witness's testirrony, the
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c ') _

The

standard of care by which the ce:'encant' s =r.duct "'cs to C:e judged.
~:evertheless,

the objection was er:-oneoesly sustair.ed, and t!-.e plair.t:::

vraS, t!ierccy, C.enied the right to a, full and fair cross-exar.inatio::
rrost pertir.ent subject of the witness's
E.

dir~

testiror.y.

The question propounded to Dr. :Jelsor. is clearly retenal :::

releva.":t.
Since the question objected to was asked or. cross-exai"T\ir:atior., :
rrost fur:.Car.ental inquiry regardi..'1g the relev-or.cy of the testi.-rony soi.:<;t:: ,,
already been consicered ai:ove, that is, whatever was t.'"ie subject of t!-.e
wit.'1ess' s testi..-rony on direct is a legiti.TTate area of inqctry on crosse.~.ination.

The cross-e:xcrr.ining party r.ot only has a right to c;;o u:tc c.-.

such sueject rretter fully ar..d. canpletely, he should C:e given great latlt.i:
in

so doir.;.

;.lford, supra, and E<.esurrection Gold Yiin., supra.

F<Jwever,'

the objection v..-as stated to be Ca.sed on a lack of rreteriallty and relevar:=
an ar..alysis of the standarc of rreteriality and relevancy is appropriate,
Traditionally a distinction
relevancy.

r.as

'ceen :rade bet,-een r:-atenahty ::.

:'he question of rrateriali ty gees to •kether the testirror.y

elicited relates to a rratter in issue.

.:-'.cCor.:Uck on E:Vi:::!.ence, at 434 (2::

Relevancy relates to whether evicence is prote.tive, that ls ·Nhethe:- it te:~
to prove or disprove a fact in issue.

~k:Cor.rick, ~· at 434.

Tr.us,

evidence needs to be l:oth related to facts in issue and tend to, L'1 soce"
prove or disprove one of trose facts.

This distinction between the tem

materiality and relevancy is articulated less frequently today, but tl:e :<:·
kind of analysis is :rade: evidence clearly ~st be related to r.-etters ir.
issue and tend to prove or disprove such i'\Otters.

2? .;:rr.. Jur 2d, ~
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::or:versely, unless excluded by sorr.e specific rule of exclusion (i· .e. , p.ear_ay
"
~cle, 2€st Evidence Rule, etc.) , all evidence of facts and circumstances

tendJr.g to prove or disprove any proposition which is in issue is properly

acir:u.ssi ole and sue!-; evidence :rn.J.St not te exchrled.

Foster v. Keatino, 120

c.;... 2d 435, 261 P.2d 529 (1953); PDle v. Eole, 76 C.A. 2d 344, 172 P.2d 936
'.l946); Eerkshire v. P.arerr, 181 O.R. 42, 178 P.2d 133 (1947); Keeney v. City

of ::'1edand Park, 203 I<"an. 389, 454 P.2d, 456 (1969).

Tr1e testiroc:ny sought l:;y the question clearly relates to a rratter in
issue; llldeed it relates t.'"ie single :cost irrporc.ant issue in a rredical rralpractice
case: the establism.ent of the corrrnunity standard of care.

The standard of

care is wi trout a doubt the single rrost irrportant consideration in proving er
disprovir.g liability in a rredical rralpractice case.

HJw physicians in the

carrnuni ty perform the rredical procedure in question determines the standard of
care.

~e

witness is a practicing physician engaged in the same specialty as

t:-ie defendant and practices in the sarre corrrnunity.

Hew tr.e witness perfonns

t!'.e rredical procedure in question clearly relates to the CO!Tilll.ll".ity standard of
care ar..d, therefore, clearly relates to a "rratter in issue."

The evidence

scught is rraterial.
The question, likewise, is probative on the issue of the a::mmm.ity
standard of care, that is, the answer to the question would tend to eit.'"ier
prove or disprove the standard of care the defendant was attenpting to establish
•,.Ii.th the witness.

If the witness had testified that he performed the rredical

procedure in question in the sarre rranner he described as the standard of care
in tt:e carmur.i ty, that would give greater weight to the establishrent of that

standard.

If, on the other hand, he testified tli.at his practice was different

than the standard des=ibed by him as the ccrnmmity standard, a wl'Dle new line
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of questioning would te appropriate.

If the new line of qJestionrng est.a;:

that the witness's own practice reflects a higher standard of care, the!:
ought to l::e made aware of that fact1 as such fact, would, unless explair.e'
tend to lessen the witness's testi..'TOny regarding the proper

·

COITTTI\.lru_ ty stc;~

The fact that the question was asked of an expert on cross-eXilrrr
adds a further dirrension to the question of relevancy.

It is generally

recognized that the standard of relevancy is applied less strictly on cm
examination tran on direct.
Evidence, §29 (2d ed.).

81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witr.esses §476; McCo.nnick on

Thus, it is widely held that any question which•,

to explain, =ntradict, or discredit the evidence offered by a witr,ess, er
serves to test his accuracy, rrerrory, veracity, credibility, or

~ialit

is proper or-, =oss-exarnination, even though irrelevant or r-errote.

Weter i

Water Conserrcr.cv I;ist. v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 802 (1959); 81.:.Jur. 2d, Witnesses §476, 484.

The effectiveness of cross-exanunationasc

prol:e into these areas is "the principal factor in establishing crnssexamination as one of the chief agencies for the developnent of truth
judicial inquiries."

m

Further, "cross-examination is not confined to the

identical details testified to in chief, but extends to its entire subject
matter, and to all matters that rray rrodify, supplerrent, contradict, rebut,
or make clearer the facts testified to in chief by the 1vitness."
Witnesses IM81.

81 ~m. J.'

Utah cases recognized such areas of inquiry as the inter.&

purpose of cross-exarni."'lation.

In Weber Basis i-;ater C'.onservancy Distri.fLJ

10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959), the court rever-sed the trial judge wrr
did not allow responcient to s11fficiently cross-exarrine in these legitimate
In so doing, the =urt stated:

The purpose of cross-exarnination is to give adversary
=unsel the opportunity not only to ir.qoJ.ire into uncertainties
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relating to the testirrony in chief, but to test its
credibility. vmatcver rray tend to explain, m:xl.ify
or contradict that direct evidence should be allowed.
~eter Basin, suora, at 864-65. (See also State v. Peek.)
Thi.:.s,

questions that would be objectionable on the basis of irrelevancy

if asked on direct, are proper when asked on cross, if the questions are

reasonably designed to elicit testirrony which tends to explain, m:xJ.ify, or
contradict the witness's direct testirrony, or to serve to test his accuracy,
:rerrory, veracity or irrpa.rtiality.
Even greater latitude must be given in the cross~xarnination of
an expert ·...ritness who has given testirrony based on his expert opinion.
.:\m. Jur.

2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence §45, 48.

31

l-ny question which tests the

accuracy and value of the witness's opinion or credibility is proper on
cross~xamination.

Coca-Cola v.

~bor,

246 F 842 (8th Cir. 1917); State v.

Peek, 1 litah 2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 (1953).

Thus, in 31 Am. Jur. 2d,

~

and Ooinion Evidence 848, it states:

liberal range of examination is allowed touching
all rratters testified to in chief, or tending to test
the aualification, skill, or knowledge of the witness
and the accuracy or value of his opinion. ***The
cross~xamination of an expert witness is not confined
to the specific questions and details of the direct
examination. 'The witness rray be tested on the basis
of any pertinent additional fact that the cross~xaroiner
rray see fit to cover, or rrey be called upon to answer
hypothetical questions pertinent to the inquiry.
***The data on which an expert witness rests his specific
opinion, as distinguished fran the knowledge whi~h .
qualifies him to offer one at all, rrey be fully inquired
into upon cross~.xamination. Inquiry rray be rrede into
the reasons for the witness's opinion, and the rrethods
by which he arrived at his conclusions, the difference
between his opinion and other experts, as well as errors
of opinion which he has rrade in other similar cases.
31 Am. Jur. 2d, supra at 848 (errphasis added.)
A
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In the instant case, the obvious intent of the propounded que,t.,

"'2.S to test the accuracy and validity, of the witness's opinion and atter;t
rrodify, contradict, and, if possible, rebut the expert witness's opini'"
O,,
concerning the comm.mi ty standard of care.

The purpose and intent of fa ,

question clearly falls within the proper J::ounds of cross-examination, ir.C;
it is the classic situation for which cross-exarnination is so ur_iquely s:::
as a tool of judicial inquiry.

The witness has testified extensively or.

direct examination as to the carrnuni ty standard of care, he r.as given hls
opinion as to wrat he tr.inks the standard is, and has answered hy:;othetk
questions put to hi.rn by the party which has paid him to testify, •,;hich
questions are asked of him based on the fact that he is a rredical speciaL
engaged ir: t1-.e sane speciality as the defendant doctor, and practicing
the sar.ie carmuru ty.

l!.

If justice ever begged a char.ce to test the accuraq

a 1-Jitness' s opinion, to scrutinize in detail the data on "hlch that opir.i:
is based, and the factors considered in fonning it, to inquire into poss1:.
bias or irTpartiality, in short, to have the opportunity to fully and
rorrpletely rrake inquiry into all areas which can reasonably be exrected to
rrod.ify or, in sar.e "'2.Y, contradict the witness ' s testirrony, it is in just
such a situation.

If the witness had been required to answer, and were tc ,

have answered that his practice conformed to the standard he testifiedtc
his testirrony would have been strengtr.ened.

If the witness were tor.ave

answered that his practice differed from the standard he described to th: '
jury as the proper standard, then the jury ought to know in what respect:;
practice differed, why his practice differed, if other doctors in tte are:
pracriced in conforiri.ty with the witness's practice; if sc, how rrany: H
why not?

If the wi.tness had answered that his practice were different, a
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new li::1e of questioning then tecomes relevant and legitirrate cross-examination.
?laintiff was r.ot allowed to go into this iJilxlrtant line of questioning, which
exan-ination ver1 reasonably could te expected to m:Jdify or even rebut the
test:urony given by the 'Nitness; the court ruled in limine tr.at no crossexan-ination in this area would l::.e allowed.
G:Jld Min.,
plaintiff

~.
~o..s

As in Alford, supra, Resurrection

v,'eter Easin Water, supra, and in Zolantakis, supra, the

denied, at the outset, all cross-examination into an area that

·.-ias, by all standards, rra.terial, relevant and legi tirrate cross-examination.
Plaintiff had a right to fully and fairly cross-examine the defendant's
exp::rt witness in this area, and denial of that right was prejudicial and
reversible error.
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons and upon the grounds outlined above, tf.e
appellant respectf'.llly urges the Court to reverse the judgrnc·
of the court below and remand this case for a ~ew trial
Respectfully submitted this

/S

~

.

day of January, 1979.

4{~:'/.J~e>u

Ma den G. Dixon, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff-,:;ppi
1900 North Canyon Road
Suite 304
Provo, Utah
84601

Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-.:'\ppell:
to David

w.

Slagle, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent,

Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
day of January,

1979.
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